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ACTING BEFORE VICTIMS BECOME VICTIMS:
PREVENTING AND ARRESTING MASS MURDER
W. Michael Reisman
Whoever saves one life earns as much merit as though he had saved 
the entire world.
Talmud Yerushalmi, Tractate Sanhedrin 4:5 
To save one life is to save all of humanity. 
Qur’an, 5:32 
Murder, the taking of life, is the ultimate and irrevocable violation 
of human dignity and, for each individual, the ultimate terror. Because each 
of us fears being murdered, we all look to our various communities for the 
protection of our individual lives; Hobbes laid motives of this sort at the 
very foundation of the state,1 and H.L.A. Hart saw the inability of even the 
strongest among us to defend ourselves all the time as an imperative for the 
existence of a legal system. Even the most powerful person, Professor Hart 
observed, must sometimes sleep.2 The raison d’être of the modern state, and 
 McDougal Professor of International Law, Yale Law School. This paper was delivered 
as the Klatsky Lecture at Case Western Reserve University School of Law on January 15, 
2008. A webcast of the lecture is available at http://law.case.edu/lectures/index.asp?lec_id= 
153. The author acknowledges the assistance of Heide Iravani, Yale Law School, J.D. 
expected 2009. 
1 See generally LEO STRAUSS, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES: ITS BASIS AND ITS 
GENESIS 12 (1936) (“The second of the ‘two most certain postulates of human nature’ which 
Hobbes takes as basis of his political philosophy, along with the ‘postulate of natural appe-
tite’, is ‘the postulate of natural reason’, ‘qua quisque mortem violentam tanquam summum 
naturae malum studet evitare’. In accordance with naturalistic reasoning this postulate is 
reduced to the principle of self-preservation: since the preservation of life is the condition 
sine qua non for the satisfaction of any appetite, it is ‘the primary good’. As a logical conclu-
sion of this thought, Hobbes attempts to deduce natural right, natural law, and all the vir-
tues—the four Platonic cardinal virtues—from the principle of self-preservation”); C.B.
MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE 19–
20 (1962) (The state of nature depicts the way in which men, being what they are, would 
necessarily behave if there were no authority to enforce law or contract. Given the appetitive 
and deliberative nature of man . . . this is the way they would necessarily behave if law-
enforcement and contract-enforcement were entirely removed. This behavior would neces-
sarily be an incessant struggle of every man with every man, a struggle of each for power 
over others.”).  
2 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 191 (1961).  
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a major purpose of international law, is the provision of security, which 
means the protection of individual lives.  
Yet, for all the urgency that each of us gives to this ultimate and 
most individualized form of personal security, and for all the intensity of 
our demands on our governments to guarantee it, there is little that any gov-
ernment, even the most authoritarian and controlling, can actually do to 
prevent single acts of murderous violence. Democratic governments, which 
must try to requite popular demands, face special obstacles here; for impor-
tant policy reasons, they must resist proactive preventions and perforce look 
to other preventive methods, such as socialization. Socialization is a long-
term strategy, cultivated at every level of social organization, that tries to 
redirect violent impulses into socially approved channels and, in particular, 
away from fellow group members. The fact that group members continue to 
murder one another, however, demonstrates that socialization is far from a 
perfect preventive strategy.  
Whether the result of a momentary impulse or of a covert premedi-
tation, murder is accomplished in a single, instantaneous and irrevocable 
act. By its very nature, no single institutional body is capable of preventing 
every murder. All any government can do to meet our demand for personal 
security is to provide some second-best remedies.  
One of these remedies involves apprehending the perpetrator after
the fact and punishing him via elaborate legal procedures and ceremonies. 
This may provide vengeful satisfaction to those who loved the victim and 
the illusory reassurance to the rest of us that, by punishing that particular 
murderer, each of us has somehow been made safer from suffering that 
crime. The debate rages over the deterrent value of punishment. But even 
assuming that ex post punishments do, in some statistical sense, deter the 
future commission of many of the same sort of crimes, that promise of de-
terrence suffers from the problem common to the individualization of all 
statistical projections: there can be no assurance that the punishments—no 
matter how notorious they may be and how high the statistical probability 
of deterrence—will deter their commission in our individual case! 
In some traditional cultures, a murder can be expiated by the pay-
ment of blood money. In the United States, the national community may, 
under some circumstances, issue compensation for murders.3 But what 
prospective victim would look eagerly to compensation as an attractive 
swap? We want to avoid being murder victims; yet, in terms of community 
remedies, neither punishment for murder nor compensation to survivors 
really provides us with what we want. These remedies are mere second-best 
solutions, which is about the most we can hope to get.  
3 See Victims of Crime Act, 42 U.S.C § 10601 (1984). See generally W. Michael Reis-
man & Monica Hakimi, Illusion and Reality in the Compensation of Victims of International 
Terrorism, 54 ALA. L. REV. 561 (2003). 
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In simple arithmetic terms, mass murders may seem to be merely an 
accumulation of many individual murders. But in terms of the preferred 
solution of prevention—an unattainable solution for individual murders—
mass murders are different in that many of the individual murders that to-
gether comprise mass murder are preventable. Unless a mass murder is ac-
complished with a single devastating weapon of mass destruction, such as a 
nuclear bomb or a chemical or biological weapon, the business of killing a 
large group of people takes time, communication, and organization. It re-
quires assembling the victims and delivering them to the killing grounds, in 
addition to recruiting, transporting, and maintaining both the killers and 
their tools. Also, one must provide for the killers’ upkeep and arrange logis-
tics, the maintenance and transportation of ammunition, and the disposal of 
corpses. In sum, there are many gritty details that go into setting about and 
murdering a great number of people.   
Because mass murders are an organized social activity with a tem-
poral extension that increases in proportion to the number of victims, others 
can quickly verify that the individual murders which have been perpetrated 
up until that moment of perception are only the beginnings of a series which 
is going to be repeated until the targeted group is annihilated to its last man, 
woman, or suckling babe.  
This means that, unlike individual murders—the vast majority of 
which can only be punished after the fact—many of the individual murders 
that comprise a mass murder can be prevented. Prevention can be accom-
plished by arresting the killing process as soon as it becomes apparent that 
mass murder is imminent or underway, thereby restraining the number of 
victims from expanding and even reaching the totality the perpetrators are 
seeking. In short, if long-term socialization, punishment, and compensation 
are all a community can do when confronted with individual murders, those 
manifestly second-best remedies are not the only thing that can be done for 
mass murder. Even if the murders at the beginning of the series cannot be 
prevented and may prove just as instantaneous, irrevocable, and irremedia-
ble as any other individual murder, the remaining deaths that together com-
prise mass murder can be prevented. 
Let me be clear: I have no objection whatsoever to prosecuting and 
convicting murderers, be they individual or mass killers. But if life is the 
most precious of things, then I ask you, should not acting to prevent before
the fact, as opposed to acting to punish after the fact, be the primary tech-
nique of international law for dealing with mass murder? 
I
Genocide is one form of mass murder that has been considered es-
pecially hideous. Yet from the time it was prohibited as a legitimate war 
strategy and was made an international crime, the global community has 
preferred to invest its efforts in punishment rather than prevention.  
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The Holocaust, the systematic murder by Nazi Germany of six mil-
lion Jews, extended over a span of three years. Hitler declared the “Final 
Solution” at Wannsee on January 20, 1942,4 and the physical destruction of 
European Jewry concluded only with the defeat of the Reich in May 1945. 
We now know that President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill 
learned about the genocide while it was being conducted.5 Declarations of 
severe punishment for its perpetrators were solemnly issued, but not a single 
B-29 Flying Fortress was dispatched to either bomb the rail lines carrying 
victims to the gas chambers or destroy the gas chambers themselves in an 
effort to arrest the genocide. That was not for lack of resources. At the time, 
thousands of sorties were dispatched to destroy Dresden, a non-military 
target.
Instead of making the most minimal effort to prevent notorious and 
systematic mass murder, the Allied Powers took an easier course: punish-
ment after the fact. Six months after Hitler had taken his own life and the 
German Armed Forces had issued their Instrument of Surrender to the Al-
lied Powers, the first international war crimes trial was held in Nuremberg. 
In all, two-hundred war crimes defendants were tried, but only twenty-four 
members of Hitler’s elite circle were prosecuted as “Major War Criminals” 
before the International Military Tribunal. Twelve men were sentenced to 
death.6
The international human rights movement has celebrated the trials 
at Nuremberg as a vindication of human rights and as a milestone on the 
road to installing a regime for international protection. The celebration tends 
to obscure the fact that no efforts were made to arrest or prevent the geno-
cide that had led to the Nuremberg trials. Nor has the precedent laid at Nu-
remberg deterred later atrocities in the Balkans, Cambodia, Rwanda, and the 
Sudan, to name a few. Nuremberg has, however, set one ironic precedent. In 
each of those mass murders, little or no effort was made to prevent or arrest 
them; on the contrary, the preferred strategy has always been “Nurember-
gian”—to wait for the mass killings to play themselves out and then to es-
tablish criminal tribunals.  
After the trials at Nuremberg, the belated international reaction to 
the Holocaust was, of course, the Convention on the Prevention and Pu-
nishment of the Crime of Genocide. The United Nations General Assembly 
4 See Protocol of the Wannsee Conference, Jan. 20, 1942, available at
http://www.ghwk.de/engl/protengl.htm.  
5 See generally ARTHUR MORSE, WHILE SIX MILLION DIED: A CHRONICLE OF AMERICAN
APATHY (1968); HENRY L. FEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RESCUE: THE ROOSEVELT 
ADMINISTRATION AND THE HOLOCAUST, 1938–1945 170 (1970) (the first reports of the Final 
Solution reached State Department in 1942). 
6 See The Nuremberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69 (Int'l Mil. Trib. 1946). 
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approved the Convention on December 9, 1948, and it was opened for sig-
nature on that day. It came into force on January 1951.  
Genocide is defined in Article 2 of the Convention as  
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in 
full or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as 
such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calcu-
lated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.7
Article 3 of the Convention provides that:  
The following acts shall be punishable: 
(a) Genocide; 
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; 
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; 
(d) Attempt to commit genocide; 
(e) Complicity in genocide.8
Genocide is considered a punishable act, but note the lack of em-
phasis on the prevention of preventable acts. To be sure, the title of the 
Convention is “the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide” 
and Article 1 gives priority to prevention, stating “[t]he Contracting Parties 
confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of 
war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and 
to punish.”9 Yet the apparent priority accorded the prevention of genocide 
in the title and in Article 1 is misleading. Most of the rest of the Convention 
deals with punishment after the crime has been committed. Article 4 obliges 
state parties to punish persons committing genocide “whether they are con-
stitutionally responsible rulers, public officials, or private individuals.”10
Punishment after the fact. Article 5 requires state parties to enact the neces-
7 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. II, Dec. 9, 
1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
8 Id. at art. III. 
9 Id. at art. I. 
10 Id. at art. IV. 
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sary legislation to give effect to the Convention “and, in particular, to pro-
vide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other 
acts enumerated in Article 3.”11 Punishment after the fact.  Article 6 states 
that persons charged with genocide “shall be tried by a competent tribunal 
of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such in-
ternational penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those 
Contracting Parties that have accepted its jurisdiction.”12 Punishment after 
the fact. Article 7 removes genocide from the category of “political crimes” 
for the purposes of extradition and the states’ parties to the Convention 
commit themselves “to grant extradition in accordance with their laws and 
treaties in force.”13 Punishment after the fact.
Each of these provisions deals exclusively with punishment after 
the fact. Not one provision deals with prevention. The only provision in the 
entire Convention that is dedicated to prevention is Article 8: 
Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United 
Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they 
consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of geno-
cide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III.14
Surely, there was more than one legal strabismus here. Mass mur-
ders are likely to be perpetrated by governments within their own territories, 
so obliging those same governments to prevent and punish genocide is on 
the order of solemnly assigning the proverbial fox to guard the henhouse, 
and then pretending that meaningful measures have been taken to protect 
the roost. As for the governments of other Contracting Parties that the Con-
vention seemed to be enlisting to take action to prevent or arrest a mass 
killing, the duty assigned to them by the Convention is discretionary and, at 
that, remarkably light: they “may call upon the competent organs of the 
United Nations.”15 Not “they shall” or “they must.” They may. And upon 
whom may they call? At the time, the only “competent” organ in the United 
Nations was the Security Council. What duty was assigned to the Contract-
ing Parties who were members of the Security Council? To “take such ac-
tion . . . as they consider appropriate” to prevent or suppress genocide.16
The Genocide Convention did not even try to require the permanent and 
non-permanent members of the Security Council to exercise the powers the 
U.N. Charter accorded them to prevent or stop mass killing.  
11 Id. at art. V. 
12 Id. at art. VI. 
13 Id. at art. VII. 
14 Id. at art. VIII. 
15 Id.
16 Id. 
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Article 8 was a timid and contingent treatment of the issue of pre-
venting genocide. In the universe of the Genocide Convention, all that any 
state party could do was to “call upon” the Security Council. Considering 
the gravity of the offense, it is astonishing that no provision in the Genocide 
Convention imposed an obligation erga omnes on each state party to act 
meaningfully to prevent or suppress acts of genocide. 
II
The mantra endlessly intoned at the time of the conclusion of the 
Genocide Convention was “never again.” This mantra notwithstanding, 
since the Convention entered into force, there have been many mass mur-
ders. In international law and politics, the remedy du jour for virtually every 
mass murder has not been to try to prevent them or to arrest the murders as 
they were occurring but to wring our hands, utter condemnations and issue 
resolutions, allow them to run their course, and then to establish internation-
al tribunals and punish a few of the perpetrators. There is no evidence that 
any prosecution has served to prevent any subsequent mass killing. Consid-
er only a few examples:  
The murder in Kampuchea (Cambodia) of an estimated 1.7 million 
people—twenty percent of the country’s population—between 1975 and 
1979 was accomplished as the world looked on. The facts—massive expul-
sions from cities, forced labor, and inhumane living conditions—were ap-
palling.  
Hundreds of thousands of people were brought to killing fields 
where they were forced to dig their own graves. They were then either shot 
or beaten to death with iron bars, or were buried alive to save bullets. In the 
notorious “S-21” camp, 14,000 prisoners were killed; seven survived.17 The 
media reported many of the incidents but until 1978, when Vietnam invaded 
Cambodia, no foreign government made any attempt to stop the mass mur-
der.
On the contrary, some of the leading states in the world community 
seemed more concerned with protecting Cambodian sovereignty than with 
preventing that sovereignty from being used to murder over a million hu-
man beings. When Vietnam invaded Cambodia, drove Pol Pot’s forces from 
power, and finally stopped the killings, the United States led a group of 
states within the United Nations in a move to deny the new Cambodian 
government its seat in the General Assembly, insisting that the Khmer 
Rouge was still the legitimate government! Even more, during the 1980s the 
17 DAVID CHANDLER, VOICES FROM TERROR AND HISTORY IN POL POT’S SECRET PRISON 5–
21 (1999). 
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United States reportedly gave $80 million in aid to the Khmer Rouge to 
fight against the Heng Samrin government.18
The international community neither prevented the mass killings 
nor arrested the killers. Now, almost thirty years later, and almost a decade 
after the death of Pol Pot, the United Nations has set up a hybrid tribunal to 
punish the few surviving leaders of the Khmer Rouge.19 By the time the 
trials begin to pick up pace, the defendants, many of whom are well into 
their eighties, may no longer be alive (One senior member of the Khmer 
Rouge died in custody last year without ever having delivered any testimo-
ny).20 Whether or not the trials actually take place, the point of emphasis is 
that, as the international human rights movement focuses its attention on the 
trials, it ignores the real lesson to be drawn: the international community 
had done nothing to prevent the mass killing or to arrest the killers.  
In Rwanda in 1994, from April 6 through mid-July—little more 
than three months—500,000 Tutsis and thousands of moderate Hutus were 
murdered. The United Nations, which had a force in the country, had been 
forewarned that mass murder was being planned; yet it elected to withdraw 
its presence over the protest of General Romeo Dallaire, the leader of the 
peacekeeping force.21 The United States, France, and Belgium, along with 
the United Nations Security Council all had advance warning and all re-
fused to make any effort to prevent or stop the massacre. It was not until 
after the massacre that the United Nations established a special international 
tribunal to try those responsible for the genocide. 22
The most devastating part of this account concerns the mass killing 
currently being perpetrated in the Darfur region of the Sudan. This conflict, 
18 See KENTON CLYMER, THE UNITED STATES AND CAMBODIA, 1969–2000: A TROUBLED 
RELATIONSHIP 142 (2004). 
19 See Judges Sworn in for Khmer Rouge, BBC NEWS, July 3, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk 
/2/hi/asia-pacific/5140032.stm. As of November 2007, when the first defendant made his 
initial appearance in court, there were only five suspects in custody. Charges against them 
include war crimes and crimes against humanity, such as managing the Tuol Sleng prison 
mentioned earlier, where nearly 14,000 people died. Originally scheduled to conclude its 
proceedings in 2009, the tribunal is now projected to exceed that date by at least three years 
due to the need to address internal conflicts over law and procedure. Indeed, divisions be-
tween local and international staff have threatened to derail the entire process. See Guy De 
Launey, Khmer Rouge Trial Raises Hope of Justice, BBC NEWS, Nov. 20, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7103955.stm. 
20 Guy De Launey, Rocky Road to Khmer Rouge Trial, BBC NEWS, Feb. 26, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6389721.stm.  
21 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL: THE FAILURE OF HUMANITY IN 
RWANDA 290–93 (2004). 
22 Between the first trial in 1997 and June 2006, only twenty-five persons had been con-
victed (and three acquitted). INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA,
ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE ICTR, http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/factsheets/achievements.htm 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2008). 
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which began more than five years ago in 2003, has claimed over 200,000 
lives and displaced almost 2.5 million people.23 An estimated 4.2 million 
people in Darfur are in dire need of humanitarian assistance as a result of 
the conflict. The government of the Sudan has broken repeated promises to 
rein in its militia allies in the region, and Darfur rebels have shown little 
interest in negotiating a peace agreement. Meanwhile, Darfur’s people con-
tinue to suffer. 24
Of course, there has been no dearth of declarations. The U.S. Con-
gress declared the fighting in Darfur genocide on July 22, 2004;25 then-
Secretary of State Colin Powell followed suit on September 9, 2004.26 Other 
countries have referred to the mass killings as “ethnic cleansing” rather than 
“genocide”—a rather frivolous semantic debate given the circumstances. A 
woefully inadequate military force was dispatched.27 But despite wide-
spread international denunciations of the Sudanese government’s role in 
what are clearly mass killings, the killings have continued.  
As for the Security Council, the repository of responsibility for pre-
vention under Article 8 of the Genocide Convention, it has passed Resolu-
tions on Darfur. Once again, however, the emphasis was placed on punish-
ment after the fact and not on prevention.28 In March 2005, by which time 
the scope of the continuing atrocities was well known, the Security Council 
passed resolution 1593, referring the matter to the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) for investigation and prosecution.29 The United Nations congra-
tulated itself for finally establishing an “accountability mechanism” to end 
23 Darfur Conflict, REUTERS, Oct. 24, 2007, http://www.alertnet.org/db/crisisprofiles/SD_ 
DAR.htm (reporting that the United Nations estimates 200,000 dead, and 2.2 million persons 
displaced in Darfur, with over 200,000 refugees displaced to Chad). 
24 The OHCHR has consistently reported publicly on sexual violence in Darfur in periodic 
reports. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
FOR VICTIMS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE 2 (2005), available at http://www.ohchr.org 
/Documents/Countries/darfur29july05.pdf.  
25 CHARLES COREY, U.S. CONGRESS TERMS SITUATION IN DARFUR ‘GENOCIDE:’ SENATE,
HOUSE PASS CONCURRENT RESOLUTIONS ON DARFUR, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/is 
/Archive/2004/Jul/26-233176.html (last visited February 26, 2008). 
26 Powell Calls Sudan Killings Genocide, CNN.COM, Sept. 9, 2004, http://www.cnn. 
com/2004/WORLD/africa/09/09/sudan.powell/index.html. 
27 In early 2008 a joint U.N.-African Union peacekeeping mission was deployed in Darfur, 
seeking to end almost five years of fighting. Most experts agree, however, that the number of 
forces currently on the ground is woefully insufficient and is therefore unlikely to bring any 
meaningful change. See Louis Charbonneau, Too Few Troops Deployed in Darfur—UN's 
Ban, REUTERS, Jan. 8, 2008, http://africa.reuters.com/top/news/usnBAN824830.html. 
28 In July 2004, Resolution 1556 was passed, demanding that the Sudanese government 
disarm, apprehend, and try the janjaweed. In September 2004, Resolution 1591 strengthened 
an arms embargo, asset freeze and travel ban. 
29 S.C. Res. 1593, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005). 
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the culture of impunity for perpetrators of the mass killings that continued 
to take place as the resolution was drafted and passed.30
Very few saw or, at least, acknowledged the irony of these interna-
tional institutional responses. The Catholic Archdiocese’s Justice and Peace 
Commission in Northern Uganda, examining comparable actions in Ugan-
da, observed wryly: “[t]o start war crimes investigations for the sake of jus-
tice at a time when the war is not yet over, risks having, in the end, neither 
justice nor peace delivered.”31 That is certainly the situation in the Sudan. 
Sudanese authorities have repeatedly refused to cooperate with the ICC, 
arguing that Sudan is capable of trying the cases in Darfur.32
Sudan is a case of neither effective prevention nor effective pu-
nishment. Following the announcement of the summons, Eric Reeves wrote 
in the Sudan Tribune:
What we have at present, then, is the public naming of two particularly vi-
cious actors in the Darfur genocide, but with no prospect of extradition, 
justice—or deterrence. It is a very small step . . . [and it] does nothing to 
address the overwhelmingly urgent issue of the moment: protection for 
30 Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Refers to Situation in Darfur, Sudan, 
to Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. SC/8351 (Mar. 3, 2005), available 
at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8351.doc.htm. This was not the most rapid of 
the United Nations’ responses. The U.N. World Summit of September 2005 produced an 
“outcome document” (unanimously endorsed) committing the international community to a 
“responsibility to protect” civilians who are victims of genocide, ethnic cleansing, or crimes 
against humanity and asserting that such a responsibility supersedes claims of national sove-
reignty. Nevertheless, the National Islamic Front (NIF) regime in Khartoum, which is made 
up of the same men who orchestrated the systematic destruction of Darfur’s tribal popula-
tions, was told that there would be no U.N. peacemaking force without its consent. Eric 
Reeves, Accommodating Genocide, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2006, at B07, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/01/AR2006090101453.ht 
ml?sub=new. 
31 Mahnoush H. Arsanjani & W. Michael Reisman, Developments at the International 
Criminal Court: The Law-in-Action of the International Criminal Court, 99 AM. J. INT’L L.
385, 385 (2005). 
32 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LACK OF CONVICTION: THE SPECIAL CRIMINAL COURT ON 
THE EVENTS IN DARFUR 1 (2006), available at http://hrw.org/backgrounder/ij/sudan0606/ 
sudan0606.pdf. On February 27, 2007, the ICC’s Prosecutor filed the Application required 
by Article 58 of the Rome Statute, requesting the Chamber to summon Ahmad Muhammad 
Harun, Sudan’s former Minister of State for the Interior, and Ali Kushayb, a Janjaweed lead-
er in West Darfur, to appear before the Court. See Situation in Darfur, the Sudan, ICC-02/05, 
Prosecutor’s Application Under Article 58(7), 4 (Feb. 27, 2007). The Prosecutor chose to 
issue “summons” versus arrest warrants, in hopes that the Sudanese government would 
choose to cooperate if served with a “less intrusive” procedure. Article 58 of the Rome Sta-
tute specifically permits the Pre-Trial Chamber to issue arrest warrants instead of summonses 
to appear. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 58(1)(b), July 17, 1998, 
37 I.L.M. 999, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rome 
_Statute_120704-EN.pdf. Not surprisingly, the summonses have been ignored. 
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vulnerable civilians and for humanitarian organizations operating in Dar-
fur.33
Certainly there has been no prevention. 
Given the timidity and indecision I have described, it is not at all 
surprising that, since the beginning of the ICC’s involvement in 2005, the 
Sudanese government has not ceased its aerial bombardment of Darfurian 
villages. Ethnically targeted violence in Darfur—murder, rape, and pillag-
ing—has continued unabated. It was not until 2007, after receiving the long-
awaited permission of the Sudanese government, that the Security Council 
agreed to deploy a peacekeeping force of up to 26,000 military and police 
personnel to Darfur to supplement the largely ineffective African Union 
forces.34 Even before the deployment, which began this winter, there were 
already indications that the peacekeeping mission lacks sufficient funding 
and technology to be effective on the ground.35 To date, only one-third of 
the forces have actually been sent to Darfur, a number far too small to stop a 
conflict that has persisted for the past five years.36
If it seems that I have painted a somber picture, keep in mind that 
the cases I have mentioned are among the few instances in which states 
have come together to attempt to remedy the act of mass murder at all—
even if largely through declarations and threats of punishment rather than 
prevention. Many such atrocities go virtually unacknowledged by the inter-
national community.  
Here is an example: In January 1971, only a few years before the 
mass killings began in Cambodia, Idi Amin, the commander of the Ugandan 
army, overthrew the elected president, Milton Obote. During his eight years 
in power, the number of people killed by Amin’s government is estimated to 
have ranged from 80,000 to 500,000. The mass murders were widely re-
ported. Despite this extended period of mass murder, Idi Amin was elected 
head of the Organization of African Unity in 1975, and from 1977 to 1979 
33 Eric Reeves, The ICC “Application” Concerning Int’l Crimes in Darfur, SUDAN TRIB., 
Feb. 28, 2007, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article20496.  
34 See Security Council Authorizes Hybrid UN-African Operation in Darfur, UN NEWS 
CENTRE, July 31, 2007 (reporting that the new hybrid force, UNAMID, will take over peace-
keeping operations from the existing African Union Mission in Sudan). Unfortunately, only 
roughly one third of the Mission’s soldiers have been deployed thus far due to the lack of 
sufficient helicopters and other heavy transport vehicles. See Charbonneau, supra note 27. 
35 See Edith M. Lederer, UN Chief Warns that Without 24 Helicopters New Darfur Peace-
keeping Force is at Risk, ABC NEWS, Dec. 6, 2007, available at http://abcnews.go.com/ 
International/wireStory?id=3966207 (reporting that the U.N.-African Union force, set to 
begin deployment in late December of 2007, has been unable to acquire enough helicopters 
to make the mission effective). 
36 See Charbonneau, supra note 27. 
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Uganda, mirabile dictu, was elected to the United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights.37
The killing would likely have gone unabated, had Tanzania not in-
vaded Uganda in late 1978 and overthrown Amin’s government.38 Amin 
fled to Libya and then to Saudi Arabia, where he was given asylum, as 
voices were raised over Tanzania’s violation of Uganda’s sovereignty. 
Amin died in 2003 in a Saudi hospital without ever standing trial for mass 
murder.39 The score in Uganda: no prevention, woefully belated arresting 
(with its lawfulness actually challenged), and no punishment.40
III
As strange as it may seem, many international lawyers take issue 
with the lawfulness of the few effective efforts to stop ongoing mass mur-
ders. Consider the reaction to NATO’s action to stop the mass killing that 
occurred in Kosovo in 1999. NATO bombed Serbia into submission without 
the authorization of the Security Council prescribed by the U.N. Charter. 
Kosovo is currently under United Nations supervision. What is fascinating 
about this one case of relatively rapid international action to stop mass kill-
ing is that it aroused great disquiet and even criticism of many of the inter-
national legal custodians of the world community.  
The Danish Institute of International Affairs published its study of 
the Kosovo intervention in 1999 and opined that the U.N. Charter prohibits 
such unilateral humanitarian interventions. Similarly, the Dutch Advisory 
Committee on issues of public international law and the Dutch Advisory 
Council on International Affairs stated in 2000 that “Article 2(4) of the 
Charter lays down a peremptory ban (jus cogens) on the use or threat of 
force and hence does not leave any legal latitude for armed intervention on 
37 See Idi Amin: A Byword for Brutality, NEWS24.COM, July 21, 2003, available at 
http://www.ugandamission.net/aboutug/articles/amin.html#03-0721. 
38 TONY AVIRGAN & MARTHA HONEY, WAR IN UGANDA: THE LEGACY OF IDI AMIN (1982).  
39 See, e.g., Ethan Bronner, Editorial Notebook; The Obscenely Easy Exile of Idi Amin,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2003, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A07E5D71030 
F93AA2575BC0A9659C8B63; see also Ugandan dictator Idi Amin buried, CNN INT’L,
Aug. 17, 2003, http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/africa/08/17/saudi.amin/index.html.
40 The humanitarian crises mentioned thus far do not include mass killings that have not 
even reached the international punishment stage, let alone international efforts at arresting or 
preventing. Take, for example, the pogroms in Indonesia between 1965 and 1967, when 
more than one-half million ethnic Chinese were murdered under the pretext that they were 
Communists. See generally JOHN ROOSA, PRETEXT FOR MASS MURDER: THE SEPTEMBER 30TH 
MOVEMENT AND SUHARTO’S COUP D’ETAT IN INDONESIA (2006). Consider also the 2002 riots 
in Gujarat, India, where over a thousand Muslims (human rights groups claim many more) 
were killed by Hindu nationalists. See generally GUJARAT: THE MAKING OF A TRAGEDY 9 
(Siddharth Varadarajan ed., 2007).  
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the territory of another state without the latter’s consent.”41 The House of 
Commons’ Foreign Affairs Committee issued its Fourth Report in 2000 on 
the NATO military action and concluded that, although the intervention 
may have been moral, it was “of dubious legality in the current state of in-
ternational law.”42 The Kosovo Report, which was prepared on the initiative 
of the Prime Minister of Sweden in 2000, also stated that NATO’s interven-
tion was illegal because of the lack of prior approval by the Security Coun-
cil but, in a way comically disrespectful of international law, conceded that 
“the intervention was justified because all diplomatic avenues had been 
exhausted and because the intervention had the effect of liberating the ma-
jority population of Kosovo from a long period of oppression under Serbian 
rule.”43
In response to the international lawyers’ disquiet over taking action 
to prevent further mass killings in Kosovo, then Secretary General Kofi 
Annan created a High Level Panel (HLP) in 2004 to prepare a report on 
“our State Responsibility.” The report stated:  
We endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective international re-
sponsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing 
military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other 
large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international 
humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or 
unwilling to prevent.44
This statement, which has been celebrated in some quarters as a ma-
jor step forward, is at once conservative, radical, and vacuous. The conserv-
ative element of the HLP statement is that it merely confirms an authority 
that was already clearly within the Security Council’s domain. The Council 
has the competence to authorize military action under the broad “threat to 
the peace” contingency of Article 39 of the Charter and has done so for hu-
41 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INT’L AFFAIRS, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION NO. 13, 18 
(2000), available at http://www.aiv-advice.nl/ContentSuite/upload/aiv/doc/AIV_13_Eng.pdf. 
42 HOUSE OF COMMONS FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, FOURTH REPORT, 1999–2000, H.C. 
28-I, para. 138. 
43 THE INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT 4
(2000).
44 Report from the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure 
World: Our Shared Responsibility, para. 203, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinaf-
ter High-level Panel Report]. Of course, the High-level Panel was not an international law-
making body nor is the Secretary-General, who established the Panel, someone who can 
contribute to “state practice.” Yet, the process of international law making has certainly 
expanded to include many non-state participants. See W. Michael Reisman, The Democrati-
zation of International Law-Making Processes and the Differentiation of Their Application,
in DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TREATY MAKING 15, 23 (Rüdiger Wolfrum & 
Volker Röben eds., 2005). 
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man rights matters since 1965. This is why Article 8 of the Genocide Con-
vention logically reposed responsibility for prevention in the Council. The 
HLP report actually shifts into reverse gear, reducing clear law to the status 
of an “emerging norm” reinserted, as it were, into the law-making womb, 
from which the HLP predicts it will emerge at some indeterminate moment 
in the future. The notion of an emerging “norm” is itself rather slippery, 
especially with respect to the right or obligation to use force to stop mass 
killing. It is not obvious at what point an “emerging” norm can be relied 
upon, nor who is authorized to determine and to announce its formal “emer-
gence.”
The apparently radical element of the HLP report is that the hereto-
fore discretionary vote of non-permanent members of the Council and the 
librum veto of the permanent members are supposedly being transformed 
into a “responsibility” to take action when faced with mass killings and oth-
er severe human rights deprivations occurring within a state that is unwil-
ling or unable to stop them. The soft “may” in Article 8 of the Genocide 
Convention might seem to be developing into a hard “must.”  But, here 
again, there is less in the HLP report than meets the eye. “Responsibility” is 
not a “duty” to act.45 Even if it were a “duty” incumbent on each member of 
the Security Council, who is to enforce it, and what is the sanction for non-
compliance? Although the HLP report leaves critical questions unanswered, 
the answers are clear: no one will enforce such a “responsibility” and there 
will be no sanction for non-compliance. 
Furthermore, the contingency that the use of force be employed on-
ly as a “last resort” to arrest mass murders such as genocide will not mean 
much to prospective victims. Is the implication that, even if the members of 
the Security Council were really inclined to act, they must patiently wend 
their way through diplomatic measures and economic sanctions before 
bombing gas chambers, crematoria, or Janjaweed militias?  
The most constricting part of the HLP Report, however, is its impli-
cation that only the Security Council has the legal competence to take ac-
tions or authorize others to take action to stop mass murders. Is that still a 
legally correct or practicable solution? To consider that question, we must 
look more closely at the constitutional structure of the United Nations. 
45 Benedetto Conforti suggested that a “responsibility” or “duty” to protect is meaningless 
with reference to positive international law because there is no means of enforcement or 
remedies for inaction. There is only a moral duty to arrest serious violations of human rights. 
BENEDETTO CONFORTI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS 
166–71 (1993).
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IV
You will recall that when the Genocide Convention finally turns, in 
Article 8, to action to prevent and suppress genocide, it looks to the “com-
petent organs” of the United Nations. At the time, the only organ competent 
to undertake prevention was the Security Council. That monopoly in the 
constitutional system of the United Nations may have since ended. As such, 
it is now necessary to consider, along with the Security Council itself, the 
potential competence of a number of other U.N. agencies. Let us review 
them briefly. 
A. The Security Council  
When the Genocide Convention was concluded, there was no legal
uncertainty with respect to the competence of the Security Council to en-
gage in or to authorize action in a case of genocide or mass killing. Both the 
language of the Charter and a limited amount of subsequent practice con-
firm that the Security Council continues to be competent to conduct or to 
authorize either regional organizations or other states to conduct military 
operations within a state to arrest severe human rights violations.  
Charter Chapter VII contains the powers that the Security Council 
may use to discharge its primary responsibility to “maintain and restore 
international peace and security.” The Security Council itself determines 
whether a situation or an event threatens international peace and security. 
The trigger-contingency of a “threat to the peace” in Article 39 is undefined 
and hence, open-textured. To be sure, Charter Article 2(7) prohibits the 
United Nations’ interference in matters “which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state.” It is hard to imagine that anyone is ac-
tually possessed with some sort of grotesque Westphalian notion where a 
government’s murdering large groups of its people is solely a matter of do-
mestic jurisdiction.46 Even such sovereignty-crazed elites will be disap-
pointed, for Article 2(7) makes an explicit exception for “the application of 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII.” The Rhodesian incident in 1967 
made clear that the Council can find that severe human rights violations 
within a state, caused by the actions of its government, can constitute a 
threat to the peace and serve as a basis for Security Council action—even 
when there are no manifest external consequences. 
At the time, Rhodesia was a controversial exception; the practice of 
the United Nations in the 1990s, however, has “shifted to a perception that 
internal violations of human rights could threaten international peace and 
46 U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 7, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993 (Dec. 9, 1948). 
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security.”47 Large-scale human rights violations are no longer buffered from 
international concern on the ground that they are “essentially within the 
jurisdiction” of the perpetrator-state. 
The fact that the Security Council has the authority to act in cases of 
genocide and mass murder does not mean that the Council will act. For rea-
sons that are too familiar to require elaboration, the Security Council has 
proved itself on many occasions unable to secure the agreement of all of its 
permanent members, which is a prerequisite for the Council to exercise its 
compulsory powers. On those occasions, either the Council has not acted, or 
the compromises necessary for securing unanimity have produced ineffec-
tive or anodyne resolutions. The Genocide Convention’s effort to recruit the 
Security Council to prevent mass killings has not worked, and the omens of 
the future are not promising.  
B. The General Assembly 
In the so-called “Uniting for Peace” Resolution, the General As-
sembly stated that when there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly  
47 SUSAN BREAU, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS & COLLECTIVE 
RESPONSIBILITY 238 (2005). The first clear link between human rights violations within a 
state and international peace and security was Security Council Resolution 688 in the 
Iraq/Kuwait crisis, though it did not authorize a Chapter VII action. S.C. Res. 688, para. 1, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (Apr. 5, 1991). The operation in Somalia was the first in which the 
Security Council authorized intervention in an internal conflict under the terms of Chapter 
VII of the U.N. Charter without invoking possible cross-border dimensions of the conflict. 
S.C. Res. 794, para. 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992). Nevertheless, even for the 
Security Council, the responsibility is not to protect, but rather to maintain peace. Security 
Council Resolutions for Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo mention a responsi-
bility to maintain peace and security and a grave concern for the violations of human rights 
and loss of material property, but never speak in terms of responsibility to halt the human 
rights violations per se or a responsibility to protect. The Resolution on Somalia recalls the 
Security Council’s “primary responsibility . . . for the maintenance of international peace and 
security” and links the loss of human life and material damage to peace and security in the 
region. S.C. Res. 733, U.N. Doc. S/RES/733 (Jan. 23, 1992). The Resolution on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina recalls the Security Council’s “primary responsibility . . . for the maintenance 
of international peace and security” and links the loss of human life and material damage to 
peace and security in the region. S.C. Res. 713, U.N. Doc. S/RES/713 (Sept. 25, 1991). J. 
Frowein and N. Krisch find that an “evolution of the concept of a threat to the peace to in-
clude violations of human rights reflects the increased importance of the individual in the 
international legal order but it does not warrant the conclusion that any severe violation of 
human rights could give rise to [Security Council] action under Chapter VII.” Jochen Frowe-
in & Nico Krisch, Introduction to Chapter VII, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY 701, 725 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2002). “The [Security Council] enjoys its 
far-reaching powers only for matters of peace and security; it is not set up to enforce all 
overarching values of the international community.” Id. 
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shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate 
recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the 
case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force 
when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.48
In the Certain Expenses Opinion49 and, more recently, the Wall Opinion50
the International Court has confirmed the Assembly’s competence to exer-
cise Chapter VII-type powers in circumstances that require such action, but 
the Security Council proves paralyzed.  
In Certain Expenses, the Court found that, as “each organ must, in 
the first place at least, determine its own jurisdiction” within the bounds of 
the Charter,51 Assembly deployment of peacekeeping forces was not ultra
vires if it is carried out for the fulfillment of one of the stated purposes of 
the United Nations. In the Wall opinion, the Court went so far as to equate 
the Assembly and the Council by saying that the United Nations, “especial-
ly the General Assembly and the Security Council, should consider what 
further action is required to bring to an end the illegal situation” the Court 
had found existed.52
The General Assembly commands no forces of its own. May the 
General Assembly, then, in implementation of this so-called “required” 
48 G.A. Res. 377 (V), para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (Nov. 3, 1950). This authority has been 
used only rarely, notably in the 1950s during the Korean crisis and to establish the United 
Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities be-
tween Egypt and Israel in 1950. Soon it became clear that financial and military support of 
the major powers of the world were imperative for any successful enforcement action. More 
importantly, there was a lack of will—“those [major] powers were not willing to see the 
General Assembly lead in this area; thus, the General Assembly simply could not go it 
alone.” Sean Murphy, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING 
WORLD ORDER 120 (1996).
 49 The jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice suggests that the Court is likely 
to find issues of human rights abuses within the scope of U.N. competence. In Peace Trea-
ties, the Court’s decision implied that questions of international law cannot be considered 
matters essentially within the jurisdiction of a state. Interpretation of Peace Treaties with 
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, Advisory Opinion, First Phase, 1950 I.C.J. 65, 70 (Mar. 
30) (finding that the interpretation of the terms of an international treaty could not be consi-
dered as a question essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state). A similar implica-
tion was made in Norwegian Loans.Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9, 
51–52 (July 6) (separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht) (noting that though, prima facie, the 
conduct of a state may be within its domestic jurisdiction, numerous matters, such as the 
treatment of its citizens, are now the subject of treaties and customary rules of international 
law). 
50 See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 148–51 (July 9). 
51 See Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 163–71 
(July 20). 
52 Construction of a Wall, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 200.  
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“further action,” authorize a state or coalition of states to act to stop geno-
cide or mass killing when it is occurring within a state whose government is 
either responsible for or unable to halt it? The answer might be that the As-
sembly may so authorize by certifying that, in its view, (i) there is a need to 
act under Chapter VII, and (ii) the Council has proved itself unable to do so. 
In the Wall Opinion, the International Court’s rather permissive approach to 
the Assembly’s competence to make such findings suggests that these mat-
ters are not objective but rather fall to the judgment of the General Assem-
bly itself.53  If the Assembly is competent to issue authorizations to either 
regional organizations or individual states to act to arrest mass killers in a 
particular case, it would appear that the action taken by these delegates 
would not constitute a violation of international law, as long as it was not 
conducted in ways that violated the jus in bello.
That said, analyses of this sort are redolent of the speculations of 
medieval scholars on the number of angels on the head of a pin. The men 
and women of the General Assembly must have been aware of the cases of 
mass killing since 1945, yet the Assembly has never done anything effective 
about any of them. The chances of the Assembly actually agreeing to au-
thorize an action in the future are remote. 
C. Regional Organizations 
Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter envisions a contingent role for re-
gional arrangements in matters relating to the maintenance of international 
peace and security. Other than making an effort “to achieve pacific 
settlement of local disputes,”54 regional organizations may be, “. . . where 
appropriate, utilize[d by the Security Council] for enforcement action under 
its authority.”55 Nevertheless, regional organizations have no unilateral en-
forcement power, as “no enforcement action shall be taken under regional 
arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the 
Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state. . 
. .”56
A regional organization could be authorized by the Security Council 
or, under the theory explored in the preceding pages, by the General As-
sembly acting under Uniting for Peace to undertake an action to prevent or 
arrest an ongoing mass killing. Without such authorization, a regional or-
ganization’s conduct of such an action would constitute a violation of inter-
53 As noted in the Certain Expenses case, the General Assembly may determine its own 
jurisdiction.  
54 U.N. Charter, supra note 46, at art. 52, para. 2.  
55 Id. at art. 53, para 1.  
56 Id. 
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national law, in the absence of a persuasive theory under which unilateral 
action could be deemed lawful.  
Some interesting developments may intimate constitutive changes. 
Article 4(h), of the Constitutive Act of the newly formed African Union 
prohibits any one member state from intervening in the domestic affairs of 
another member state. But the Act establishes “the right of the Union to 
intervene in a member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in re-
spect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide, and crimes 
against humanity.”57 According to the Act, decisions of the Assembly are 
taken by consensus, “failing which, by a two-thirds majority.”58 Further, 
“the Assembly may delegate any of its powers and functions to any organ of 
the Union.”59 Article 4 is thus a contingent invitation to intervene in in-
stances of genocide. It may be inconsistent with the U.N. Charter but, of 
course, new customary international law is made through violations of exist-
ing law to which other states acquiesce. It remains to be seen if the Security 
Council will “acquiesce” to the African Union claim and, more important, 
whether it will prove an effective means of preventing mass killing. If, in 
1948 the authors of the Genocide Convention really thought that they were 
providing for an effective means of preventing or arresting genocide by 
referring the matter to the competent organs of the United Nations, they 
were mistaken. The competent organs of the United Nations have failed to 
prevent genocide. 
V
In 1995, in the Supplement to the Agenda for Peace, then-U.N. Sec-
retary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, observed that  
One of the achievements of the Charter of the United Nations was to em-
power the Organization to take enforcement action against those responsi-
ble for threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression. 
However, neither the Security Council nor the Secretary-General at present 
has the capacity to deploy, direct, command and control operations for this 
purpose, except perhaps on a very limited scale.60
 57 Constitutive Act of the African Union, art. 4(h), July 11, 2000, 2158 U.N.T.S. 33, 37. 
The Constitutive Act also provides for the “non-interference by any Member State in the 
internal affairs of another.” Id. at art. 4(g).  
58 Id. at art. 7.  
59 Id. at art. 9, para. 2.  
60 The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organiza-
tion, para. 77, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General 
on the Occasion of the Fifteenth Anniversary of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/50/60–
S/1995/1 (Jan. 3, 1995). 
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After reviewing the modalities available to the United Nations, in-
cluding “preventive diplomacy and peacemaking; peace-keeping; peace-
building disarmament; sanctions and peace enforcement,” Boutros-Ghali 
went on to say that 
The United Nations does not have or claim a monopoly of any of these in-
struments. All can be, and most of them have been, employed by regional 
organizations, by ad hoc groups of States or by individual States . . .61
Boutros-Ghali’s observation is particularly pertinent to actions to 
prevent mass murders or to arrest killers. Assuming that the “responsibility 
to protect” has reached parity with the principle of state sovereignty, when 
formally authorized international institutions fail to respond to events that 
are the predicate of this responsibility, may states, acting individually or in 
coalitions, be deemed to be contingently empowered under international law 
to act unilaterally to stop a mass killing?   
The High Level Panel Report referred to earlier does not state that 
such a secondary, contingent competence now exists. In paragraph 207, 
however, it tantalizingly recommends that the prudential considerations it 
proposes for Security Council actions for implementing the responsibility to 
protect should also be principles of general application: “[w]e also believe it 
would be valuable if individual Member States, whether or not they are 
members of the Security Council, subscribed to them.”62 Why should other 
states be urged to subscribe to them if they are not going to be exercising 
them? 
There is a great gulf here between international law’s formal struc-
tures on unilateral action to prevent mass killings and the implication of 
Boutros-Ghali’s observation. The U.N. Charter codified a prohibition of 
threats or the use of a state’s unilateral force, only allowing some very nar-
row exceptions. Article 2(4) enjoins members to “refrain in their interna-
tional relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations.” Some scholars, myself included, 
have argued that implicit grounds upon which to base such action may be 
found in the language of the Charter. Specifically, an action whose only 
purpose was to prevent or arrest mass killing would neither constitute a vi-
olation of the territorial integrity or political independence of a state, nor be 
in a “manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” These 
arguments have failed to win a consensus.63
61 Id. at para. 23. 
62 High-level Panel Report, supra note 44, at para. 209. 
63 ALBRECHT RANDELZHOFER, Article 2(4), in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY 112, 130–31 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2002). 
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The General Assembly has passed three resolutions on the issue of 
intervention by states.64 While indicating a general animus against it, all of 
the resolutions acknowledge that certain special situations may justify mili-
tary intervention. So far, “special situations” have been limited to decoloni-
zation, as the General Assembly has not extended its consensus to cover 
mass killings.
On various occasions, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has 
addressed Article 2(4)’s prohibition on the threat or use of force. In each of 
these cases, the ICJ has very narrowly construed the legal uses of armed 
force, leaving little or no room for the inclusion of unilateral humanitarian 
action. In Corfu Channel,65 the Court interpreted the prohibition on the use 
of force broadly, leaving the impression that under the U.N. Charter there 
are no implicit exceptions to Article 2(4). In particular, the Court held that 
the inability of an international organization to discharge a function as-
signed to it could not justify noncompliance with the prohibition on the use 
of force and allow the organization to resort to unilateral action.66 In Nica-
ragua67 the Court reaffirmed the general character of the prohibition on the 
use of force—a rule which it held to be part of customary international law, 
and thus independent of the operability of the collective security system of 
Chapter VII of the Charter.68 The Court also held that international law does 
not permit the use of armed force to redress violations of human rights in 
another state.69 In Nuclear Weapons70 the Court seemed to confirm that it 
still regarded both self-defense against an armed attack and Chapter VII 
Security Council military enforcement actions as the only exceptions to the 
64 The first Resolution, entitled “Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the 
Domestic Affairs of States and Their Independence and Sovereignty,” declared that “[n]o 
State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal 
or external affairs of any other State.” G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/6014 
(Dec. 21, 1965). The second Resolution was titled “Declaration on Principles of International 
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations.” G.A. Res 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/8028 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
The third Resolution, entitled “Definition of Aggression,” stated that “no consideration of 
whatever nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a justifica-
tion for aggression.” G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIV), art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974). 
However, the third Resolution contains an exception in order not to “prejudice [a people’s] 
right to self-determination, freedom, and independence . . . nor the right of these peoples to 
struggle to that end and to seek and receive support.” G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIV), art. 7, U.N. 
Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974).  
65 See Corfu Channel Case (Alb. v. U.K.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).  
66 Id. at 34–35. 
67 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. V. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). 
68 Id. at 99–100. 
69 Id. at 134–35. 
70 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 
(Jul. 8).  
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prohibition on the use of force.71 The Court noted in DRC v. Uganda72 that, 
though Security Council Resolutions recognized that all states in the region 
bear responsibility for securing peace and stability, “this widespread re-
sponsibility of the States of the region cannot excuse the unlawful military 
action of Uganda.”73
VI
For anyone who is horrified by the prevalence of mass killing on 
our planet and expects the institutions of international law in the twenty-first 
century to act—or to authorize someone to act—to prevent or arrest it, the 
legal situation is not encouraging. Notably, the explicit language of the U.N. 
Charter, as repeatedly and authoritatively construed, does not allow actions 
to prevent or arrest mass killings without Security Council authorization, 
and the Security Council is unlikely to authorize such an action. The legal 
uncertainty of the scope of lawfulness of a secondary authorization by the 
General Assembly persists; the Assembly is also unlikely to take such ac-
tion. There is no consensus on a right of unilateral “humanitarian interven-
tion” to protect victims of large-scale human rights violations, including 
genocides and mass killings. 
Three recent cases, however, may suggest the emergence of a more 
nuanced customary international law regime. Liberia was the scene of a 
bloody civil war with large-scale human rights violations. By August 1990, 
a group of West African nations, under the auspices of the Economic Com-
munity of West African States (ECOWAS), established a Standing Media-
tion Committee for the purpose of investigating disputes and conflicts with-
in the community. The Committee concluded that 
These developments have traumatized the Liberian population and greatly 
shocked the people of the sub-region and the rest of the international 
community. They have also led to hundreds of thousands of Liberians be-
ing displaced and made refugees in neighbouring countries, and the spil-
ling of hostilities into neighbouring countries.74
71 Id. at 244. 
72 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of The Congo (Dem. Rep. of The 
Congo v. Uganda) (Judgment of Dec. 19, 2005), para. 152, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/116/10455.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2005). 
73 Id. at para. 152. This is a curious statement, as Uganda never claimed its actions to be 
excused on the basis of Security Council Resolutions, but rather on the basis of self-defense. 
74 Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS], Standing Mediation Com-
mittee, Final Communique of the First Session, para. 8 (Aug. 7, 1990), reprinted in 6
CAMBRIDGE INT’L DOCUMENT SERIES, REGIONAL PEACE-KEEPING AND INTERNATIONAL 
ENFORCEMENT: THE LIBERIAN CRISIS 73 (M. Weller ed., 1994).  
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In view of these internal and external effects, ECOWAS dispatched 
the Economic Community Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). It 
was a military expedition, and it succeeded in temporarily stopping the 
bloodshed and ethnic killing. 
The Security Council never authorized the ECOMOG intervention, 
but after its initial successes the President of the Security Council did 
“commend” the Committee’s efforts. Even at this point, the Security Coun-
cil did not authorize ECOMOG to use “all necessary means,” despite the 
fact that there was a transboundary “threat to the peace.” Nonetheless, the 
reaction of the international community to the ECOMOG intervention was 
almost universally favorable.  
Consider also the aforementioned NATO intervention in Kosovo, 
which provides a different lens for examining what may be an emerging 
opinio juris on this issue. The large-scale and manifest human rights viola-
tions then occurring in Kosovo might have been invoked as the sole basis of 
justification for the unilateral action. Yet no major participating government 
relied exclusively or primarily on some sort of theory of humanitarian inter-
vention, or on an international responsibility to act to arrest mass killing. 
Most participants portray the intervention as relying on Security Council 
Resolutions 1199 and 1203, which condemned Belgrade’s violations of 
human rights in Kosovo, even though none of the Resolutions included an 
authorization to act, whether through the Organization or unilaterally. 
For example, France relied on Former Yugoslavia’s non-
compliance with Resolutions 1199 and 1203, arguing that “the legitimacy of 
NATO’s action lies in the authority of the Security Council.”75 Germany, by 
contrast, emphasized the humanitarian disaster that made military interven-
tion necessary, but still argued that NATO’s action, though unauthorized by 
the Security Council, was nevertheless consistent with the “sense and logic” 
of Council Resolutions.76 The United States focused on particular factual 
circumstances, foreshadowing a humanitarian catastrophe of immense pro-
portions,77 and submitted that the NATO military intervention “[i]n this 
context . . . [was] justified and necessary to stop the violence and prevent an 
75 Press Release, French Foreign Ministry (Mar. 25, 1999), quoted in Jane Stromseth, 
Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for Incremental Change, in HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 235 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. 
Keohane eds., 2003) [hereinafter HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION]. 
76 Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L.
1, 12 (1999).
77 Press Release, Security Council, Statement of Ambassador A. Peter Burleigh, U.N. Doc. 
SC/6657 (Mar. 24, 1999). The United States “believed it was necessary to respond to Bel-
grade’s brutal persecution of Kosovar Albanians, violations of international law, excessive 
and indiscriminate use of force, refusal to negotiate to resolve the issue peacefully and recent 
military build-up in Kosovo.” Id. 
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even greater humanitarian disaster.”78 Nevertheless, as a formal legal mat-
ter, President Clinton, like the government of France (and President George 
W. Bush in Iraq), relied primarily on the Former Yugoslavia’s non-
compliance with Resolutions 1199 and 1203. In March 1999, the United 
Kingdom came closer to invoking humanitarian intervention as a distinct 
legal basis for NATO’s military action.79  One month later, Prime Minister 
Tony Blair expressed a more conditional position: 
Under international law a limited use of force can be justifiable in support 
of purposes laid down by the Security Council but without the Council’s 
express authorization when that is the only means to avert an immediate 
and overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe. Any such case would in the 
nature of things be exceptional and would depend on an objective assess-
ment of the factual circumstances at the time and on the terms of relevant 
decisions of the Security Council bearing on the situation in question.80
Subsequent British statements linked the justification for NATO’s 
military action more directly to purposes articulated in Security Council 
Resolutions.81 Even when humanitarian reasons were invoked by states, 
they were cast as an exception rather than as part of an emerging rule. Only 
Belgium defended NATO’s action as a “lawful armed humanitarian inter-
vention,” taken to protect fundamental jus cogens values and to forestall a 
humanitarian catastrophe acknowledged by the Security Council.82
VII
The International Court of Justice provided a welcome reverse of 
the trend just reviewed on February 26, 2007. The Case Concerning the 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
78 Id.
79 See U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office note of Oct. 7, 1998 (arguing that force 
could be justified “on the grounds of overwhelming humanitarian necessity” without Securi-
ty Council authorization, but that certain criteria “would need to be applied”), quoted in Jane 
Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for Incremental Change, in
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 76, at 236. See also U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 
3988th mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3988 (Mar. 23, 1999) (statement of Sir Jeremy Green-
stock on behalf of the United Kingdom) (arguing “[i]n these circumstances, and as an excep-
tional measure on grounds of overwhelming humanitarian necessity, military intervention is 
legally justifiable”). 
80 330 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1999) 240, quoted in Jane Stromseth, Rethinking Hu-
manitarian Intervention: The Case for Incremental Change, in HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION, supra note 76, at 232, 236–37.
81 Id. at 236. 
 82 Legality of Use of Force at 13 (Serb. & Mont. v. Belg.) (transcript of Oral Argument 
May 10, 1999), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/105/4513.pdf.  
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Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)83
was initiated by Bosnia and Herzegovina against Serbia and Montenegro. 
The disposition of the Court’s judgment has disappointed many, but to its 
credit, the judgment expanded the responsibility of individual states to act to 
prevent and arrest genocide.  
The Court did not begin its consideration of this aspect of the case 
very auspiciously. It noted what it called “the clear links between the duty 
to prevent genocide and the duty to punish its perpetrators, which it sees as 
“distinct yet connected obligations.” In the Court’s view,  
[O]ne of the most effective ways of preventing criminal acts, in general, is 
to provide penalties for persons committing such acts, and to impose those 
penalties effectively on those who commit the acts one is trying to pre-
vent.84
With respect, that has long been an excuse for not acting to prevent 
or arrest mass killing. It is an elevation of the familiar second-best remedy 
for individual murders in domestic systems, but it makes little sense in cases 
of mass murder. We have already noted that, as an empirical matter, there is 
no evidence that punishment has been an effective deterrent in national or 
international settings. Then again, one would hardly expect the Court to 
have raised doubts about the efficacy of the institutional judicial network of 
which it is the principal organ. 
Despite this inauspicious beginning, the Court then proceeded to 
surprise us by distinguishing a “distinct” obligation to prevent. “[I]t is not 
the case,” the Court says,  
[T]hat the obligation to prevent has no separate legal existence of its own; 
that it is, as it were, absorbed by the obligation to punish, which is there-
fore the only duty the performance of which may be subject to review by 
the Court. The obligation on each contracting State to prevent genocide is 
both normative and compelling. It is not merged in the duty to punish, nor 
can it be regarded as simply a component of that duty. It has its own scope, 
which extends beyond the particular case envisaged in Article VIII, name-
ly reference to the competent organs of the United Nations, for them to 
take such action as they deem appropriate. Even if and when these organs 
have been called upon, this does not mean that the States parties to the 
Convention are relieved of the obligation to take such action as they can to 
prevent genocide from occurring, while respecting the United Nations 
83 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 169 (Feb. 26, 2007), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&k=f4&case=91&code=bhy&p3=4. [hereinaf-
ter Genocide Case]. 
84 Id. at para. 426. 
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Charter and any decisions that may have been taken by its competent or-
gans.85
Some human rights prescriptions are essentially exercises in momentary 
euphoria: they install obligations which manifestly cannot be fulfilled, and 
which none of the prescribers even expect to be fulfilled. They embroider 
the myth system of international law but not its operational code.86 It is clear 
that the Court is not involved here in such an exercise, for it has crafted the 
duty to prevent in a realistic and practicable fashion. The Court explains 
that:
[I]t is clear that the obligation in question is one of conduct and not one of 
result, in the sense that a State cannot be under an obligation to succeed, 
whatever the circumstances, in preventing the commission of genocide: 
the obligation of States parties is rather to employ all means reasonably 
available to them, so as to prevent genocide so far as possible. A State 
does not incur responsibility simply because the desired result is not 
achieved; responsibility is however incurred if the State manifestly failed 
to take all measures to prevent genocide which were within its power, and 
which might have contributed to preventing the genocide. In this area the 
notion of “due diligence,” which calls for an assessment in concreto, is of 
critical importance.87
How then shall international law determine whether a State has actually 
fulfilled its duty to prevent? The Court eschews a “one-size-fits-all” duty, 
making the duty instead a function of relative and relevant power. Among 
the parameters taken into account in assessing whether a State has an obli-
gation to prevent genocide is “the capacity to influence effectively the ac-
tion of persons likely to commit, or already committing, genocide,” which 
“depends . . . on the geographical distance of the State concerned from the 
scene of the events, and on the strength of the political links . . . between the 
authorities of that State and the main actors in the events.”88
Nevertheless, if one’s duty is a function of one’s ability, the obliga-
tion to prevent may not be sloughed off by concluding in advance that it 
would not have availed the victims of a prospective or ongoing genocide. 
The Court explains that: 
As well as being generally difficult to prove, this is irrelevant to the breach 
of the obligation of conduct in question, the more so since the possibility 
remains that the combined efforts of several States, each complying with 
85 Id. at para. 427 (italics in original). 
86 See W. Michael Reisman, FOLDED LIES: BRIBERY, CRUSADES, AND REFORMS 15–18 
(1979).
87 Genocide Case, supra note 83, at para. 430 (italics in original). 
88 Id.
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its obligation to prevent, might have achieved the result—averting the 
commission of genocide—which the efforts of only one State were insuf-
ficient to produce.89
Given the serial character of mass murder, the obligation to prevent com-
mences at a very early stage. While that obligation does not necessarily 
come into being at the onset of the genocide itself, it and the accompanying 
duty to act do begin “at the instant that the State learns of, or should normal-
ly have learned of, the existence of a serious risk that genocide will be 
committed.” At that point, the State bears a duty to use all means available 
to it to prevent or to stop the genocide “as the circumstances permit.”90
The failure to prevent is a violation of the obligation on parties to 
the Genocide Convention, but it does not necessarily constitute a crime of 
complicity, which “always requires that positive action has been taken to 
furnish aid or assistance to the perpetrators of the genocide while a violation 
of the obligation to prevent results from mere failure to adopt and imple-
ment suitable measures to prevent genocide from being committed.”91
Yet in some circumstances, a failure to prevent can be construed as complic-
ity. 
there cannot be a finding of complicity against a State unless at the least its 
organs were aware that genocide was about to be committed or was under 
way, and if the aid and assistance supplied, from the moment they became 
so aware onwards, to the perpetrators of the criminal acts or to those who 
were on the point of committing them, enabled or facilitated the commis-
sion of the acts. In other words, an accomplice must have given support in 
perpetrating the genocide with full knowledge of the facts. By contrast, a 
State may be found to have violated its obligation to prevent even though it 
had no certainty, at the time when it should have acted, but failed to do so, 
that genocide was about to be committed or was under way; for it to incur 
responsibility on this basis it is enough that the State was aware, or should 
normally have been aware, of the serious danger that acts of genocide 
would be committed.92
In light of these legal principles, the Court found that Serbia and Montene-
gro had failed to prevent the genocide at Srebenica, “whose scale, though it 
could not have been foreseen with certainty, might at least have been sur-
mised.” The Court based its decision on the Yugoslav federal authorities’ 
89 Id.
90 Id. at para. 431. 
91 Id. at para. 432. 
92 Id.
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“undeniable influence and [on] the information, voicing serious concern, in 
their possession.”93
Ironically, the finding of failure to prevent was probably greeted 
with relief in Belgrade, as it was the lesser of the charges and, in the Court’s 
view, did not incur liability for damages. The implication of the Court’s 
theory of the duty to prevent, however, could have implications for other 
genocides, one of which is being carried out as we speak. 
VIII 
Sixty years after the conclusion of the Genocide Convention, the 
shadowy obligation the Convention imposed on individual states to prevent 
or arrest genocide is beginning to acquire some legal substance. The Court’s 
handiwork is creative and realistic. It goes about as far as one could expect 
an international tribunal, especially the International Court, to go in a law-
making excursus. But, lest we slip into the self-gratifying and premature 
chorus of congratulation that has been such a recurring feature of interna-
tional law’s efforts to deal with mass murder, let us take careful stock of 
what has actually been achieved and what remains to be achieved. 
Genocide is only one form of premeditated mass murder. As a re-
sult, the Court’s amplification of the duty to prevent genocide is likely to 
lead to scholastic debate about whether an imminent or ongoing instance of 
mass murder “qualifies” as genocide, when the debate should be about how 
to avert or arrest it as soon as possible. We have already had an example of 
this type of hair-splitting in the initial international reaction to the mass kill-
ing in Darfur. 
Given the Court’s continued and considered resistance to the law-
fulness of any unilateral military action, the reiteration of the restraint on 
what is usually the most effective method of stopping mass killing in a 
state—some form of military intervention—will not be relaxed, leaving a 
broad range of lawful strategies for prevention.  
For better or for worse, contemporary international law imposes no 
limits on the use of the economic instrument. Thus, the obligation to prevent 
should, under the Court’s theory, “kick-in” with meaningful programs of 
economic sanctions as soon as it becomes apparent that a specific genocide 
is being prepared and, a fortiori, as soon as it becomes clear that it is actual-
ly underway. It would seem that, under the Court’s theory, continued provi-
sion of economic assistance to a state engaged in genocide could transform 
a failure to prevent genocide into complicity in genocide.  
Nor does international law impose limits on the proactive use of the 
diplomatic instrument. Thus, an obligation to undertake various modes of 
diplomatic pressure, and even isolation, that hold some promise of effec-
93 Id. at para. 438. 
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tiveness would seem to come into operation as soon as it becomes apparent 
that an act of genocide is imminent or underway.  
The decision of the International Court has begun to shift attention 
to, and to provide substance for, the Genocide Convention’s obligation to 
prevent and to arrest genocide. But its innovation alone is hardly likely to 
shift international law’s focus on mass killing to prevention rather than pu-
nishment. Facts are social constructs, and bringing the facts to the attention 
of politically relevant strata will depend upon the agitation of groups in civil 
society. Even when the facts have become notorious, the sad case of Darfur 
demonstrates that many international lawyers, even those most committed 
to the advancement of human rights, still seem to prefer the creation of 
more courts, the appointment or election of more judges, and the promise of 
a few ex post convictions over actually trying to stop, if not stopping, mass 
killings.
I understand their reticence and fear of abuse of the law. Each as-
signment of new powers should consider the possibility of its becoming a 
détournement de pouvoir. Unquestionably, preventing and arresting mass 
killing is a much more difficult and untidy process than a judicial proceed-
ing after the fact. When prevention requires intervention in interstate affairs, 
it becomes fraught with its own moral problems and thorny policy ques-
tions. But does not the prospect of saving lives—of acting before victims 
become victims—make it worth that trouble?  
